Aftermath

 

The Sudanese Revolution held much of the world’s attention in 2019 but as is often the case, it then faded from international popular consciousness, without resolution.

The thirtieth year of Omar al-Bashir’s reign began more precariously than anyone expected. Forced austerity measures had bought protestors out in the streets en masse. This was far from the first crisis for al-Bashir: he had dealt with a coup d’etat that saw him into office, a civil war that split the country in two, even an arrest warrant from the ICC for crimes against humanity. The impression of al-Bashir as an immovable object had always kept him in power against the odds.

This time, however, the fever of revolution did not slow down. By April 2019 protests had escalated their demands from the square outside the military headquarters in Khartoum they chanted “تسقط بس” translated “Just Fall! That is all!”

Sensing the changing winds, the military attempted to position itself as the fulfilment of the revolutionary goals. It felt like Egypt during the Arab Spring when, on the 11th of April, the army announced the removal of al-Bashir and the establishment of a military junta known as the Transitional Military Council (TMC).

This did little to quell the protests, who refused to accept a coup when they had marched for revolution. It was around this time international interest was at its highest, as is shown by the worldwide search trend for “Sudan” illustrated below.

Protests continued, the tension between the TMC and the popular uprising turned bloody on the 3rd of June. The Khartoum massacre of protestors by the military was a spectacle for the media, which took perverse pleasure in the killing of over 120 protestors.

Then the news went silent, and the story was forgotten. The world had reached the end of its attention span by the time the power-sharing accord was reached in August that year. Mass murder makes headlines, the difficult work of peace and the struggle to fulfil a revolution does not.

So then, what has become of Sudan? The accord formed a transitional government, a balance of power between civilian rule led by the coalition “forces of freedom and change”** and the military junta. The deal agreed a 31-month gradual transition from military to civilian rule, with elections to be held at the end of this period.

Transitional governments are risky business, those formed around a dual power are doubly so. They inherit the problems of a deposed government, and a citizen body keenly aware of its revolutionary potential. The baton of power seized from al-Bashir’s grip came with a failing economy, continued regional conflict in Darfur, as well as communal violence in Eastern Sudan – all this before the arrival of Covid-19.

Sudan’s regional conflicts, primarily the ethnic and communal violence in Darfur worsened following the revolution. Prior to the collapse of the Yemeni state in 2011, Darfur was often named as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. It is a conflict whose intricacy testifies to its age. The western region of Sudan has been a constellation of warring factions since the country’s independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956. It was there that al-Bashir committed his war crimes and genocide.

Now the transitional government is attempting to build a lasting peace, with support from the UN and African Union. On August 31st the Government signed the Juba agreement, initiating peace with some of the major rebel groups, and committing to cooperation with the International Criminal Court. Not all rebel groups have signed on to the agreement however and many are suspicious of a government containing military elites from the days of Omar al-Bashir. Whether this is a major step towards peace in the region remains to be seen.

Poverty is on the rise in Sudan, from 48.3% in 2019 to an estimated 56% in 2020. With a marked decrease in domestic spending, and trade with Sudan’s main partners in the Persian Gulf flagging as a result of coronavirus, the transitional government is running on loans from the Central Bank of Sudan; the deficit accounted for 40% of the government’s revenue in 2019. The subsequent inflation has led to the poverty we now see.

Yet, defendants of the new regime are not short of victories to point to. As the government puts Islamist rule behind it, secular and liberal reforms are welcome successes. The abolition of the death penalty for same-sex relations, outlawing of FGM, and discontinuation of public flogging are to be lauded. Perhaps more impressive, in September 2020 the state constitutionally ended Islamic rule, declaring all religions equal under the law, an advancement welcomed by the country’s Christian and Animist minorities.

It appears however, that much of the progress made by the transitional government is more symbolic than material. The corruption and authoritarianism of the old regime infects the new. For example, the loathed secret police the “NISS” has been renamed the “GIS” but not meaningfully reformed. Arbitrary detainment of civilians remains common practice, and allegations of torture against the government’s security forces persist.  According to the Human Rights Watch, protestors do not enjoy freedom of expression, on the first anniversary of the power-sharing deal, police used tear gas and whips to disperse protestors who were calling for faster reforms and accountability.

The military does not appear to have adjusted to the new supposedly liberal state. In July last year, the military appointed a special commissioner to bring lawsuits against individuals who “insult” the military online.

The justice that revolutionaries hoped to bring about has largely failed to emerge. Al-Bashir does face charges from the ICC, but this decapitation of Sudan’s oppressive state has left a body of government officials and military personnel alive and well. The government’s investigation into violence against protestors in Khartoum has failed to publish any findings; the investigation into human rights abuses in Darfur has similarly failed to effect any arrests.

 

One area in which the new government can be said to radically divert from the old is in international affairs. The transitional government normalised relations with Israel last year, as the third Arab Nation to do so. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chairman of the sovereignty council and leader of the military within the current government, described the move as part of a “reconciliation with the international community”. Sudan stands to gain a 1 billion aid package, removal of Sudan from the US list of terrorist organisations, and the potential lifting of US sanctions in return.

For now, change in Sudan remains a slow process. Legislative and symbolic decrees from the transitional government are one thing, but as long as the quality of life deteriorates, and the government treats its citizens in much the same manner as before the revolution, it is difficult to see what has been achieved.

On an optimistic note, elections remain scheduled for 2022, if all goes to plan this government will give way to a democratic one, with none of the political players in the power-sharing government eligible to run for any office.

Under al-Bashir and the new government alike, the Sudanese state has shown it is unwilling to reform unless forced. Sudan’s revolutionaries must not relent if they want real change.

 

E. Martin

 

 

 

*Screenshot taken 10/06/2021, shows global search trends, search trends in specific countries show a picture of more or less uniform international interest.

**An umbrella organisation including the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, the Sudanese Professionals Association, Union groups, and former political opponents to Omar al-Bashir